Articulation of Normative Interrelations: An Information Theoretical Approach by Naess, Arne
 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 1 (2005) 
 
 
Articulation of Normative Interrelations:  
An Information Theoretical Approach 
1999J 
Arne Naess 
 
The units of normative and descriptive formal logic of truth and falsity 
are propositions. These are expressed by sentences assumed to be 
unambiguous, that is, they have one single meaning, namely the 
proposition at hand. The formal logic of propositions has nothing to do 
with communication. A central concern is logical derivation. From the 
two propositions (expressed by) “All whales are fish” and “All fish are 
warm-blooded,” one may logically and correctly derive the conclusion 
“All whales are warm-blooded.” One theorem says that if, from true 
propositions, we derive correctly a new proposition, it will be a true 
proposition. In the above derivation the logical correctness is assured by 
study of the terms of the sentences expressing the propositions. The 
terms are assumed to be unambiguous, expressing definite concepts.1 
The two first propositions are generally assumed to be false, the third 
true. The logical correctness of the derivation happens to be such that a 
true conclusion is derived from two false premises. The example is 
chosen to remind us of the difference between derivational correctness 
and (assumed) truth or falsity. 
 
Heuristics is the art of finding out what is relevant when we try to 
verbally articulate our attitudes, or try to find out how we stand (or 
ought to stand) in difficult matters: our standpoints. It is largely 
admitted that it is sometimes difficult to find adequate words for what 
we mean. Less frequently, it is admitted that it is sometimes difficult to 
find out what we actually mean by what we said, or what we might, 
should, or must have meant by what we said, assuming we meant 
something at all. 
 
The process of articulating attitudes cannot be completely separated 
from that of forming attitudes, creating new attitudes or modifying old 
ones. When articulations are supposed to fit into a context of 
considerable complexity, an article, a book, a systematic exposition of 
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parts of a total view, the test of adequateness is a formidable 
undertaking. The adequateness has both an internal dimension, 
consistency and clarity within the systematizations, and an external, the 
genuineness and depth of personal acceptance of the articulation. The 
units of articulation may have the linguistic character of a term or a 
sentence. The sentence may express a norm or description, and its mode 
may be of various kinds. As an example of a mode (way of speaking), 
that of Sextus Empiricus may be mentioned; that is, non-dogmatically. 
It is still a debated issue whether the non-dogmatic way intended by 
Sextus and some other Pyrrhonic skeptics may itself be tentative and we 
get modes of the second order. I mention this only to emphasize that the 
articulation of parts of a total view is an indefinitely complex affair 
seen from a comprehensive philosophical view. What follows is, of 
course, a simplification of a fragment of the process. 
 
Suppose an articulation takes the form “It would be better for mankind 
to be fewer!” Considering that the terms man and mankind may offend, 
the articulation is changed by using humans instead. The change reveals 
a purpose to communicate with others. The term better is an 
indispensable term, however vague. But the question naturally follows: 
Better in what respect? Perhaps an articulation presents itself: “Better 
for the realization of human fundamental goals in life.” This phrase is 
rather complicated. Its relation to the first articulation is that of a 
specification (not precization). It leads naturally to a question: Which 
are the fundamental goals and what does their fundamentality consist 
in? Here, both precizations and specifications may be felt to be needed. 
There is no definite limit to the series of questions that may be asked. 
On the whole, the answers may be successively more tentative, and 
have a less obvious character of being an articulation of (non verbal) 
attitudes and well established, firm opinions. The area of relevant 
further questions increases indefinitely. There is no obvious limit that 
stops the process. But there are practical limits: the human capacity for 
articulation, thinking, energy, and stubbornness. 
 
An example may illustrate the genuineness and depth of personal 
acceptance dimension. Consider the articulation “Every living being has 
a value in itself.” One interpretation that makes the sentence 
unacceptable to me is that it follows that it is ethically wrong for 
humans to kill a living being. The intuition which makes some of us 
unhesitatingly accept the sentence as expressing a normative truth does 
not suggest, proclaim, or imply this. But exactly what does it proclaim? 
The question is not well formulated. Exactness is not relevant or even 
possible. Each of us has only met a small number of kinds of living 
beings. Of the one-celled creatures which are more or less arbitrarily 
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classed either as an animal or a plant I have only met one which elicited 
joyful identification and acceptance as a kind of benevolent fellow-
being: Eutreptiella gymnastica. She wriggled and danced with grace in 
a drop of water. Most others I have met did not elicit any positive 
feelings and some are even repulsive. It seems that the sentence about 
value in itself generalizes a kind of attitude that has been actualized 
only in a small set of experience. If we say “It is life as such, a trait 
belonging to every living being, that has value in itself,” the question 
arises whether we have any genuine attitudinal relation to such an 
abstraction. Furthermore, if we are completely indifferent towards a 
certain kind of living being, do we really attribute intrinsic value to it? 
The reflections have no definite end. What I am driving at is the 
limitless manifold of theoretically relevant questions. In practice the 
situation is different: We leave one sequence of questions and enter 
others or quit the struggle of articulations until further notice. 
 
If we say about something A, that it is dark, green, heavy, and beautiful, 
in short, that it is dagahaba, we may be wrong on 15 counts. We may 
find that A is light of weight, of colour, blue, and not beautiful, or we 
may be mistaken. Speaking in terms of information theory we say 
something is potentially carrying much more information than just 
saying that A is dark. In terms of simple calculus of propositions “A is 
dagahaba” may be analyzed into a conjunction of four independent 
sentences, p - A is dark, q - A is green, etc., A being equivalent to 
p&q&r&s. There are 16 true/false possibilities, of which only one 
makes A true. We may say that information to assert p gives only half 
of the information compared to saying p&q, 1/4 compared to p&q&r, 
1/8 to p&q&r&s. 
 
In terms of entropy, the structuralization from just asserting p to that of 
p&q&r&s, is a decrease, whereas the opposite event presents an 
increase. 
 
It is natural to believe that the quest for knowledge and insight may be 
pictured as a one-directional march towards more informatory 
assertions, longer one-directional sequences of hows and whys, and a 
resulting steady gain in information and decrease of entropy. In what 
follows I shall try to show why this is a misleading belief and I shall 
illustrate it with an account of the dynamics of normative 
systematizations. 
 
The life of a human being in all its dimensions is vastly complex and 
cannot be verbalized. There are no sets of linguistic symbols, and 
especially no set of terms and sentences mirroring or verbally copying 
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life. But verbalizations of fairly definite attitudes, sentiments, 
experiences, insights, presuppositions, behaviour patterns, and 
procedures are themselves integral parts of life. The sources of 
verbalizations are rarely or never exhausted through any definite set of 
terms and sentences. “The human will is free” relates to experiences not 
entirely verbalized through that sentence. One may distinguish different 
aspects and parts of those experiences and those related to the sentence 
“The human will is not free.”2  
 
There are traditions of mysticism in the East and the West. If we ask 
what is meant when we use the term “traditions of mysticism,” the 
answer can only have a very modest function. It may lead the people 
asking the question to some literature, some people to be considered 
mystics, or to some experiences being considered mystical. The field of 
relevant investigations is colossal and there are no authoritative 
verbalizations. These are of undisputed value as expressions of 
mysticism or as formulations within the research on mysticism, but no 
definite set of fairly precise character can make all the less precise 
obsolete. 
 
At this point, the question of sources of creative discovery and 
invention enters. These are sometimes related to the more precise, 
sometimes to the less precise, verbalizations in the form of assertive 
sentences. Consider the sentence “All living beings are ultimately one.” 
Because of the use of the term one here the sentence may be considered 
to be an expression of mysticism of some sort. The sentence may be 
said vaguely to stress the unifying or universal features of the different 
kinds of life at the expense of those differences, or to proclaim that 
there is a trait common to all life that is of outstanding importance. The 
term ultimate may limit the kind of importance to what is in the end, or 
after all, important. One avenue toward a higher level of preciseness is 
suggested by the term identification. It does not stress an actual state of 
ultimate identity but a process. 
 
The precization of the sentence, “Ultimately all life forms are one” (T0) 
in the direction of “A mature person identifies with all life forms” (Tx) 
has arbitrary features. That is, there are often directions of precization, 
some of which will develop what might be meant by ultimately. Or, the 
tentative, more precise formulations reveal weaknesses as expressions 
of an attitude, judged laudable (as a metanorm), and the original 
expression T0 (the ‘point of departure formulation’ is given up). 
 
The development of systematic thinking may in this, as in other cases, 
be thus illustrated: 
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expression of how I feel and think. In articulation of a total view, when 
pressing for articulation of basic views and attitude as well as for 
consequences for those processes in practical daily life situations, it is 
the other way around: at least when ‘burdened’ with a high formal 
education there are in the air words and sentences enough. There is a 
flow of verbalizations available. The greater problem is rather: What do 
I mean? What is the relation of my socially adequate flow of words to 
the deeper layer of my self? A sentence is offered, but exactly of what 
is it expressive when occurring in a definite situation of reflection? 
 
A hypothesis is here of great practical service: “The definiteness of 
intention is always limited.” Asking oneself or others: How did I (or 
you) interpret T0 in S, a definite datable situation of sending T0. The 
answers tend to be like this: ‘T1 or T2?,’ ‘T1,’ ‘T11 or T12?’ ‘T11,’ . . . 
‘T11 . . . 1 or T11 . . . 2?,’ ‘I don’t know.’ That is, sooner or later, sometimes 
already at the start of the question sequence, the sender or receiver 
honestly answers “I don’t know.” And this is done even when the 
relevance, appropriateness, and clarity of the alternative interpretations 
offered in the question are fully recognized by the answerer. The “I 
don’t know” type of answer has been called nescio-answers from Latin 
nescio, “I don’t know.” They testify to the limit of the definitions 
intention or interpretation of the sender of a sentence or term. When a 
receiver is asked “When you heard T0 uttered did you interpret it as 
synonymous with T1 or T2?” and so on. The same kind of limit of 
interpretation or intentionality is found.  
 
Reaching the limit of one’s intention, the task at hand may demand an 
answer. The kind of answer “I don’t know whether I have meant so or 
so” is not satisfactory. If the difference, the discrimination is relevant 
and important, one must decide what to mean. This implies a search 
centering on both one’s own attitudes, sentiments, and articulate views, 
and on features of the situation imperfectly investigated. The decision 
has a character of creativity or activeness. It is not less creative than an 
experiment in chemistry or any other cognitive activity in search of new 
insights. 
 
But so is also the work back to the crudest conceptual level, that of T0.  
If the term concept is preserved for fairly well delimited, verbalized, 
cognitive contents, then the typical T0, as found in articulations of basic 
layers of total views, is not intended to be expressive of a concept; its 
individual terms are not expressions of concepts. 
 
The back and forth movement along the axis of preciseness is of little 
theoretical and practical interest if it does not also constitute a 
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movement along the axis of definiteness of intention. The ideals of a 
maximum or a constant level of definiteness of intention are stumbling 
blocks in research. Not even in creative research within the exact 
sciences is there room for the realization of those ideals. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The statements about formal logic of propositions and terms are (of course) 
somewhat vague and ambiguous but serve their function in the context.  
2 An excellent example of distinction related to a common source is furnished by H. 
Ofstad’s thorough analysis of main interpretation of the sentence ‘x decided freely in 
the situation S’, x being a person. 
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